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Despite being characterized as ‘one of the worst agricultural accidents in Britain in the 
1960s’, the ‘Smarden incident’ has never been subjected to a complete historical analysis.  
In 1963, a toxic waste spill in Kent coincided with the publication of the British edition 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. This essay argues that these events combined to 
‘galvanize’ nascent toxic and environmental consciousness. A seemingly parochial toxic 
waste incident became part of a national phenomenon. The Smarden incident was 
considered to be indicative of the toxic hazards, which were borne of technocracy. It 
highlighted the inadequacies of existent concepts and practices for dealing with such 
hazards. As such, it was part of the fracturing of the consensus of progress: it made 
disagreements in expertise publicly visible. By the completion of the episode, ten 
different governmental ministries were involved. Douglas Good, a local veterinary 
surgeon, helped to effect the ‘reception’ of Silent Spring in the UK by telling the 
‘Smarden story’ through local and national media and through the publications of anti-
statist organizations. 
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Long shadows fell over the village and over the people who lived there. There 
was, for one thing, the shadow of the ‘boffins’ who descended on the place, lifting 
samples of earth and departing in haste for London: there was the shadow cast by 
the bowler-hats of three different Ministries …, hats belonging to important-
looking men who would neither confirm nor deny the wild rumours that were 
everywhere. 
There was, too the shadow of local officialdom – local councillors, doctors 
and veterinarians. And over all there was the shadow of death – present and 
probably potential.1 
 
Recognized as one of the most significant contributions to Western literature and as one 
of the ‘books that changed America’, Silent Spring is acknowledged as the ‘effective 
beginning’ of ‘toxic discourse’, and as a pivotal contribution to emergent modern 
environmentalism.2 The threat from radiation and chemicals lingered in the text of the 
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book. Drawing readers’ attention to these twin toxic hazards, Rachel Carson effectively 
fused pre-existent pollution concerns of urban and industrial reformers to ecological 
sensitivities of resource conservation and wilderness preservation. Gary Kroll, who has 
examined the impact of Silent Spring on public understanding of science and the 
environment, makes a case for a contextualist study of the book.3 Significantly, however, 
his analysis of ‘reception’ principally encompasses the role of media in mediating and 
shaping the dissemination of, and responses to, the book. Building on Hal Rothman’s 
argument, Kroll asserts that the various manifestations of Silent Spring – serialization for 
The New Yorker, a book, and a television exposé – collectively constituted a ‘galvanizing 
event’, which alerted the public to urgent environmental issues, and transformed local 
concerns into a national consensus. Rather than restrict his gaze to an instrumentalist 
conception of the production of ‘texts’, Kroll examines the ways in which the different 
‘Silent Springs’ resonated with specific constituencies.  
Similarly, this essay argues that an ostensibly localised disaster became a 
‘galvanizing event’ for environmental consciousness, once placed within the more 
universal context of Carson’s Silent Spring. Responses to a toxic waste incident in 
Smarden, Kent (and Merthyr Tydfil, Wales) metamorphosed into a formative assessment 
of the use of pesticides in the British countryside. In October 1963, Archie MacPhee, the 
BBC Home Service News agricultural correspondent, predicted: 
[A]lthough it is unfortunately the case today the more we need healthy crops from 
the land, the more we need more insecticides, pesticides, fungicides; in fact, the 
whole range of agricultural chemicals. Both the official and unofficial sides of 
agriculture are aware of the problem. We can thank Rachel Carson and her best 
selling book “The Silent Spring”. But I think what will have a greater effect will 
be the cases at Merthyr Tydfil and Smarden where defenceless animals were 
exposed to the subtle dangers of chemical poisoning.4 
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Significantly, MacPhee referred to ‘The Silent Spring’ and, thereby conflated the book 
title with the ‘CBS Reports’ television episode entitled, ‘The Silent Spring of Rachel 
Carson’, which aired on 4 April 1963. This television exposé highlighted an aspect of the 
book which would resonate with critics of the Smarden incident. By extending ecology 
beyond the restricted domain of traditional science, ‘The Silent Spring’ mounted an 
attack against Western scientific progress. In its various manifestations, Silent Spring was 
a fable of legitimacy: technocracy, underpinned by a consensus of science-based 
progress, confronted a contested plurality of expertise.5  
Smarden’s silent spring was, therefore, symptomatic of a ‘sea-change’ which 
beset science in the long 1960s. Jon Agar contends that this period witnessed the 
emergence of publicly visible, divergent views of experts.6 He posits three overlapping 
phenomena. First, scientists were driven to make public displays of disagreement. 
Second, emergent social movements provided fertile soil for the burgeoning demand for 
experts, and for the increasingly visible disagreements among them. And, finally, 
introspective examinations of the self elicited a challenge to faith in technocracy: the 
politics of personalism supplanted scientific expertise in aid of governance. Scientists, as 
activists, played a vital role in this process. Rachel Carson, for example, was a biologist, 
with considerable experience of working at the Fish and Wildlife Service, when she 
highlighted the contested nature of DDT. Expert knowledge about the baneful effects of 
this organic insecticide stretched back to 1945,7 but not until the 1960s were numerous 
divergent views sufficiently accessible so that they could be coordinated by the likes of 
Carson as a publicly visible debate. Journalists played an important role in this process – 
as communicators, as proxy experts, and as active critics of science. 
 4 
This essay examines the ‘long shadows that fell over the village’ of Smarden. 
More particularly, it provides an anatomy of ‘one of the worst agricultural accidents in 
Britain in the 1960s’.8 It does so by investigating the relationships between environment 
and technocracy, within the context of contested expertise. The Smarden incident arose 
out of changes to the countryside in post-Second World War Britain. Critics of the central 
government’s handling of the incident subsumed it within a broader lament against the 
rise of ubiquitous synthetic chemicals: it was part of the emergence of ‘toxic 
consciousness’. Through an exploration of the initial governmental response to the 
incident, this essay assesses the limitations of existent pollution legislation in the 1960s. 
But it also notes the different ways in which central government (hereafter Government) 
scientists, independent experts, and media framed the incident. These tensions – and their 
resonances for readers of Carson – ran through key facets of the incident. Contemporaries 
identified a local pollution episode as fundamentally important to broader arguments 
about the threats that pesticides posed to the environment, including human and animal 
health. Furthermore, as a fluorine compound, the offending toxic contaminant intersected 
with contentious debates about the fluoridation of water, which were often articulated 
within the rubric of ‘popular’ ecology.  Finally, the essay assesses the institutions, 
broadly construed, through which concerns were articulated, and upon which the 
Smarden incident cast a long and lingering shadow. 
SETTING THE SCENE 
Between late December 1962 and 23 July 1963, a pesticide firm, Mi-Dox Agricultural 
Division of Rentokil Laboratories, engaged in the manufacture of a toxic chemical. As a 
result of this industrial activity, fluoroacetamide was released into the environment, and 
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produced the first documented ‘outbreak’ of poisoning of farm livestock in Britain. 
Recounting the incident in early 1964, local veterinary surgeon, Douglas Good, began his 
tale a year earlier, in January 1963, when a worker from the Rentokil factory presented 
him with two Labrador puppies, which had died from ingestion of a suspected, but 
unknown, poison. In mid-May, G.H. Lowe called Good to Great Omenden Farm, which 
was adjacent to the same factory, after seven of his sheep had died suddenly. The 
following day, Good attended Limes Land Farm, directly across the road from the 
factory, to examine a goat, which showed symptoms of poisoning before dying several 
hours later. Suspecting that the factory had contaminated ditches and ponds with toxic 
chemicals, Good immediately contacted the Kent River Board, which had statutory 
responsibilities for the control of pollution of streams.9 
 Several days earlier, on 12 May, another local veterinary surgeon, J.S.L. Jones, 
had been called to Roberts Farm, owned by William Jull and his sons, Cyril and Norman, 
which was also adjacent to the factory. Amid a ‘high yielding and well-managed herd’ of 
26 Friesians, a cow had unaccountably collapsed. Although it survived in a distressed 
state, three other cows died suddenly in mid-May. After the deaths of several more cattle 
over the following months, Jones and Good called in the Veterinary Investigation Officer 
from Wye, Kent, who, in turn, requested the services of the Biochemistry Department of 
the Central Veterinary Laboratory on 16 July 1963. At this point, scientists affiliated with 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries (MAFF) became involved in the 
incident.10 
 The West Ashford Rural District Council (hereafter the Council) became aware of 
the incident when Judge J.D. Casswell contacted them on 28 June. Casswell wrote on 
 6 
behalf of his son, who owned Limes Land Farm, where a number of domesticated 
animals had died. The Council informed both the Kent River Board, which had already 
made an initial inspection, and the Alkali Acts Inspectorate. By late July, the local 
newspaper press was alerted to the ‘Smarden factory health menace’ after the matter was 
discussed at a Council meeting.11 
 Significantly, the exact nature of the fatal poison remained a ‘mystery’ throughout 
this period. On his first visit to Limes Land Farm in May, Good had been told by a 
former employee of the factory that fluoroacetamide was being manufactured there. The 
Kent River Board claimed that they had not received this information before they made 
their initial inspection of the affected water, and, therefore, did not test for the presence of 
the chemical. As a civil servant later observed, it seemed astonishing that the Board 
Inspector had not enquired what was manufactured at the factory when he visited it to 
take samples.12 That said, the manager, B.W.J. Wulff, was not entirely forthcoming about 
possible chemical wastes. Responding to enquiries from Good on 18 and 23 July, Wulff 
declared: 
We are not discharging any chemical effluent to ditches on our property but are 
carting all effluents away or evaporating them to dryness …. I consider it 
impossible that even in cases of gross negligence or carelessness any chemical 
effluent could be discharged from here other than Sulphuric Acid of the 
neutralised acid which would be mainly Sodium Sulphate with small quantities of 
Sodium Bromide or Potassium Fluoride, Potassium Chloride residue.13 
 
When Ministry of Agriculture scientists visited the factory on 29 July, they quickly came 
to a different conclusion. They discovered that the factory had only recently begun to cart 
its waste to a quarry in Essex. Prior to this, there was clear evidence that the land at the 
back of the factory had been used as a general dumping ground, with large, rusting metal 
drums and canisters and a black sludge in close proximity to ditches which 
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communicated with ponds and streams in neighbouring properties. A relative of Jull’s 
wife, who worked at the factory as a clerk, asserted that her employers had started to 
manufacture fluoroacetamide in late December 1962. In his confidential internal report, 
MAFF scientist D.S. Papworth concluded: 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the management of the factory are 
aware of the incident or practice which may have caused the ditch to become 
highly contaminated with fluoroacetamide and fluoride waste processes, as a 
result of which they have made a statement about sulphuric acid and other 
materials, following it up by attempting to hide the evidence of what might have 
occurred.14 
 
By early August, therefore, there was strong circumstantial evidence that the animal 
deaths were caused by fluoroacetamide poisoning. Moreover, the inspection team 
acquired water samples, from the affected ditches and ponds, and tissue samples, from 
two slaughtered cows on the Julls’ farm, in order to make a more definitive diagnosis. 
Interestingly, Good later recounted that the de la Warr Laboratories, from Oxford, had 
assisted him in July, when they brought sophisticated equipment to Roberts Farm. Within 
‘minutes’, he declared, they had identified the presence of fluoroacetates. This was never 
mentioned in the copious notes of the various Governmental ministries. Instead, they 
waited until the end of November for the results of investigations on their collected 
samples. 
 In late September, however, national fear about fluoroacetamide poisoning grew 
significantly when 75-100 dogs and cats were accidentally poisoned by the same 
chemical at Merthyr Tydfil, Glamorgan, Wales. Much to the dismay of Government 
scientists, Smarden and Merthyr Tydfil became linked as part of a popular indictment of 
the dangers of fluoroacetamide. Concerned by the apparent environmental persistence of 
fluoroacetamide, MAFF placed two experimental cows on the Julls’ affected land on 7 
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October.15 The cows were left to graze, but were denied access to the ditches and ponds. 
Despite the latter restriction, one cow died in late December, and the second succumbed 
to poisoning one month later. By this time, the press had caught wind of a possible case 
of human poisoning arising from the Smarden factory. Harold Farris, one of their 
employees, was referred to the National Poisons Information Centre at Guy’s Hospital for 
testing.  
With the death of animals and a possible human victim, the Government now 
acted decisively. Fluoroacetamide was banned as an insecticide on 7 February 1964, and 
the Government declared that polluted soil from the factory site would be removed and 
dumped at sea. In addition, in late February, the leader of the Labour Party, Harold 
Wilson, announced the creation of an industrial waste inquiry, in explicit response to 
Smarden.16 The following month, soil packed with cement in oil drums was removed 
from the factory at Smarden, and transported to the Bay of Biscay, where it was dumped 
into the sea. Despite this action, MAFF did not permit the Julls to resume full operations 
on their farm until March 1965, when Government scientists no longer found evidence of 
fluoroacetamide.17 
Between the moment when Good was presented with the poisoned dogs in 
January and the time when his suspicions about the factory arose in May, a British edition 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was published in February 1963. In his Politics of 
Environment, Stanley Johnson contended that 1963 was a watershed year for 
‘environmental’ consciousness.18 It was, after all, the year in which Britain held the first 
National Nature Week, which, in turn, inspired the Duke of Edinburgh to initiate the 
movement known as ‘The Countryside in 1970’. The latter provided impetus for 
 9 
European Conservation Year in 1970. Johnson asserted that this growing environmental 
consciousness was borne of anxiety about what was occurring in the countryside; but he 
offered little explanation as to why 1963 was the year in which these anxieties were 
articulated. Although he noted the importance of Carson for the birth of the ‘ecology 
movement’, he did not locate her in the British context of the pre-existent fears for 
pesticides and other toxic chemicals. Smarden, which coincided with the British 
publication of Silent Spring, provided a forum for the expression of growing anxieties. In 
this manner, a parochial waste spill in the Kent became evidence for a nationally 
significant indictment of pesticides in the English landscape. 
Silent Spring opened with ‘a fable for tomorrow’. It described a ‘town in the heart 
of America … in the midst of a checkerboard of prosperous farms with fields of grain and 
hillsides of orchards …’. But an ‘evil spell’ had settled on the community so that it was 
now bereft of the beauty of wildflowers: fruit trees were barren, birds silenced, and 
‘everywhere was a shadow of death ….’. Carson informed her readers: ‘This town does 
not actually exist, but it might easily have a thousand counterparts in America or 
elsewhere in the world’.19 The CBS Reports ‘Silent Spring’ episode accentuated Carson 
as a wise storyteller who faced opposition from laboratory-bound scientists. Drawing on 
the tone and style of Carson’s ‘fable’, the television exposé underscored a struggle 
between non-science and science as a direct parallel with a delicate environment beset by 
an unfeeling, arrogant science.20  
Similar ambiguities arose from, and were fostered by, Good throughout the 
Smarden incident. On the one hand, as a veterinary scientist, he was uniquely placed to 
appreciate the implications of the Smarden incident. He had practised in South Africa, 
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from 1948-1952, with D.G. Steyn, with whom he remained in contact. Steyn was a 
leading expert on plants which converted inorganic fluorine compounds into highly toxic 
organic fluoroacetates.  Furthermore, Steyn subsequently served as Chief Research 
Officer of the Life Science Division of the Atomic Energy Board of the Republic of 
South Africa. Expertise on fluoroacetates and nuclear science became important for the 
contested knowledge surrounding fluoroacetamide contamination in Smarden and 
Merthyr Tydfil. In fact, by February 1964, Good was convinced that fluoroacetamide 
might, itself, contain radioactive properties that were, at present, undetectable. He, 
therefore, called for the construction of a concrete tomb on the polluted land, in 
opposition to the Government’s intention to dump the contaminated soil at sea.21 
Moreover, Good had also practised in Bedford, near the London Brick Company. The 
latter produced large quantities of sodium fluoride emissions, which resulted in chronic 
fluorine poisoning in sheep and cattle on surrounding grazing land.22 Good had expert 
knowledge and experience of the toxic properties of fluorine compounds. 
On the other hand, as an environmental advocate who exhorted toxic 
consciousness, Good assumed the role of a storyteller. In an account of the ‘Smarden 
poisoning’, which he published in a local newspaper and in the Soil Association’s Mother 
Earth, and which he broadcast on BBC Radio in early 1964, Good offered the following 
lament:  
The house-martins never came this spring, and there was no bird-song in the 
hedgerows. The only rabbits were a few young ones, picked up dead in ditches. 
The subject of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring had become a reality here in 
the heart of the Garden of England.23  
 
Good publicly acknowledged the inspiration he took from Silent Spring, and the 
assistance that he received from Rachel Carson. Privately, he also noted that he 
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appreciated another book, which had appeared as an English edition in 1963 - former 
Nazi Guenther Schwab’s apocalyptic environmental tale, Dance with the Devil. After 
sending his self-described ‘short story’ to renowned biochemist, Sir Rudolph Peters, 
Good explained: ‘It was never intended as being a scientific documentation of events, but 
rather a story for the lay reader’ – a fable of today.24 
 In keeping with his exemplars, Good provided evidence of an idyllic paradise 
besmirched by an evil spell. Roy Ingleton observes that the very idea of disasters seems 
incongruous with a county that regards itself as ‘the Garden of England’. Perhaps for this 
reason, the parish of Smarden, which encompasses about thirty square miles in the Weald 
of Kent in southeast England, was an especially powerful and poignant confirmation of 
Carson’s ‘fable’.25 The Rentokil factory, from where the toxic pesticides emanated in 
1963, sat in the middle of agricultural fields about one mile from the historic, 
quintessentially English village of Smarden.26 As if to reinforce the transnational 
character of Carson’s tale, Smarden’s celebrated historical architecture had acted as 
inspiration for many of the buildings in the restored village of Williamsburg, Virginia in 
the USA.27  
In Britain, war-time necessity had made the nation ‘a pacesetter worldwide in 
intensive agriculture’; and post-war reconstruction entailed a continued intensification of 
agricultural production that accelerated in the years following 1960. Farming 
metamorphosed into ‘agri-business’ as holdings increased; specialization and 
mechanization flourished as the mixed farm went into sharp decline. As agriculture 
became more ‘industrialized’, cheap nitrogenous fertilizers were applied to enhance soil 
fertility, and synthetic chemicals were deployed against various pests.28 Across the UK 
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between the 1930s and 1970s, cereal production increased by threefold, and the 
populations of pigs and poultry doubled. Throughout the same period, the number of 
employees on farms fell, until by the 1960s, British farming per-capita output exceeded 
all other Western European countries, with the exception of Holland. Whereas their 
numbers declined, farms increased in size amidst a reduction in agricultural labour.29  
Responding to these trends, Smarden witnessed a decline in the number of farms. 
Whereas there were about 60 farms in the parish of Smarden in 1881, numbers had fallen 
to 32 by 1950.30 Once renowned for the manufacture of broadcloth, Smarden’s local 
economy was dominated by agriculture since the nineteenth century. Initially, hops were 
the principal crop in the area, but by the mid-twentieth century, cattle prevailed. Only 
about 25 percent of Smarden’s acreage was arable.31 The heavy clay soil, which had 
proven so amenable for hops, was equally suitable for the apple trees that replaced them. 
The premises occupied by Rentokil had originally been a temporary apple pulping 
factory. In 1950, consent had been granted for the building to be used for the light 
manufacture of an apple spray. Rentokil acquired the building in 1959 to repackage 
pesticide for sale and distribution, but in1962, the company obtained planning consent for 
a factory extension, and began to manufacture methyl bromide and fluoroacetamide.32 
The latter chemical was sold as an insecticide and a rodenticide.  
Contemporaries considered the Smarden incident to be evidence of the 
unwelcome elision of country and city.33 They repeatedly remarked on the factory’s alien 
presence in the rural countryside. M. Pym, a member of the West Ashford Rural District 
Council, observed, ‘I would think if you live in a rural farming community you don’t 
expect to have sulphuric acid down your ditches and noxious smells over your hedges’.34 
 13 
Similarly, Major A.J. Palmer, another councillor, asserted that the factory ‘was not a 
suitable industry for this country locality …’.35 M.P. John Farr opined: ‘I feel that it is not 
too much to expect manufacturers of insecticides, pesticides and fungicides not to put 
their factories in the centre of some of the most fertile counties, as has been done and is 
still being done’.36 Similarly, Bill Deedes, Smarden’s M.P. and Conservative Minister 
without Portfolio, observed that a ‘less suitable place for handling traffic in toxic 
chemicals would be hard to imagine’ because it was ‘slap in the middle of a farming 
area’.37 
The response to the Smarden incident was part of a growing post-Second World 
War criticism of technocracy’s negative impact on the English environment. W.G. 
Hoskins, in his The making of the English landscape (1955), described a devastated 
English countryside, over which ‘drones, day after day, the obscene shape of the atom-
bomber, laying its trail like a filthy slug upon Constable’s and Gainsborough’s sky’. He 
continued, ‘Barbaric England of the scientists, the military men, and the politicians: let us 
turn away and contemplate the past before all is lost to the vandals’.38 Throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century, the ideal of England as a ‘green and pleasant land’ had 
been forged through a modernist commitment to preservation as realized through 
legislative planning. By the 1950s and 1960s, this mix of modernism and 
conservationism was increasingly replaced by an anti-modernist lament against the 
trashing of the countryside. Governmental science, in aid of agriculture, was pitted 
against vernacular Englishness - a Romantic re-envisioning of environment, which 
reached beyond ‘buildings and fields’.39 Smarden, the epitome of vernacular Englishness, 
had been blighted by an ugly factory which was little more than an over-grown 
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corrugated iron shed; and from which spewed chemicals that traced their origins to the 
military-industrial complex of the Second World War.40  
PESTICIDE POLLUTANTS: ‘SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES’ 
Confusion over the precise identity of the offending pollutant was symptomatic of the 
relatively recent spread of chemicals throughout the environment, and of the limited 
knowledge of their nature and impact. The two world wars of the twentieth century 
fostered a massive increase in the chemical industry, with pesticides being a significant 
component of this expansion. The science, technology, institutions, and language of 
chemical warfare were redirected to agricultural pest control during peacetime. Although 
natural inorganic poisonous pesticides had ancient roots, the mass application of synthetic 
organic pesticides was a twentieth-century phenomenon, often borne of military priorities 
and research.41 
 Whereas DDT was originally developed as an insecticide, fluoroacetamide had 
more nefarious origins. Paul Müller identified the insecticidal properties of DDT just 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, so the Second World War provided this new 
chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticide with the perfect stage on which to showcase its 
properties. Wartime concerns for agricultural production and for the threat of insect 
vectors of disease helped to accelerate the dispersal and acceptance of DDT. Faced with a 
post-war industrial cache of the insecticide, the US government released DDT for civilian 
use in August 1945.  
Moreover, the apparent ‘miraculous’ efficacy of DDT encouraged the release of 
further pesticides. But fluoroacetamide, like many other synthetic organic pesticides, 
arose from the search for a lethal chemical warfare agent. Polish scientists, who had been 
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synthesizing fluorine compounds as potential weapons, fled to England, where they 
informed British intelligence of their activities. Together with the Polish scientists, a 
group of chemists at Cambridge worked with the Chemical Research Department in 
London, Sutton Oak, and Porton to synthesize ‘highly toxic fluorine compounds’, known 
collectively as ‘fluoroacetates’, throughout the Second World War. After the war, they 
published their research on the properties and physiological action of the chemicals.42 
Fluoroacetamide (FCH2CONH2, known as 1081) had properties similar to sodium 
monofluoroacetate (NaMFA, or 1080), which had been used as a moth-proofing agent 
and a rodenticide. Because 1081 was thought to be relatively safer for humans than 1080, 
it became a popular rodenticide.43 In the UK, it was sold as a rat poison under the trade 
names ‘Fluorokil “100 Per Cent”’ and ‘Fluorkil 3’. In the late 1950s, UK farmers also 
adopted fluoroacetamide as an insecticide to protect broad beans, brassicas, strawberries, 
and sugar beet. Safety recommendations for the use of ‘Tritox’, a 1 percent concentration 
of fluoroacetamide for garden use, were issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1956. 
One year later, these recommendations were expanded to cover ‘Megatox’ (‘Vitax  F15’ 
and ‘Flac’), a 15 percent concentration of fluoroacetamide for agricultural use.44  
As Rachel Carson pointed out, the synthetic insecticide industry was ‘a child of 
the Second World War’.45 The total US production of DDT rose from approximately 10 
million pounds, at the time of its introduction, to over 100 million pounds in 1951. By the 
time that Carson drew attention to the pervasive presence of this insecticide, US 
production had peaked at 188 million pounds. And its success spawned the introduction 
of numerous new pesticides.46 If not specifically DDT, Britain embraced pesticides with 
equal abandon: within three decades of the war’s end, over 90 percent of cereals, 
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vegetables, fruit trees, and bushes were being treated with pesticides.47 Fluoroacetamide 
was subsumed within the broader discussion of pesticides. By February 1964, the 
Smarden incident had generated sufficient interest and concern for New Scientist to elicit 
a contribution on fluoroacetamide from Sir Rudolph Peters, a renowned Cambridge and 
Oxford scientist. Peters had engaged in research on chemical warfare agents during both 
world wars. Most recently, he had produced important research on the ways in which 
toxic fluorine compounds were metabolized.48  He observed: 
It is not often that a simple chemical substance becomes headline news, but this 
has happened recently with fluoroacetamide, a simple amid of fluoroacetic acid. 
Its prominence has arisen through the fact that it has been let loose from a factory 
site upon a farm at Smarden in Kent …. Fluoroacetamide was first studied in 
chemical detail by B.C. Saunders and colleagues during the Second World War. 
This was done as a defense measure ….49 
 
By the time that New Scientist contacted Peters, he was already actively involved with 
investigations surrounding the events at Smarden.  
Peters contended that a ‘whale’ of further research would be required to 
understand the full environmental impact of potential and existent insecticides; but he 
urged the necessity of their continued use to feed the growing population, and to protect 
humankind from insect-borne diseases.50 Like many other scientists, Peters placed 
insecticides within neo-Malthusian concerns for feeding a burgeoning population. He 
thereby elided the disciplining of the environment with that of the populace.51 Pesticides, 
he asserted, were essential tools for the rational management of the human population. 
But, as John Perkins has so ably demonstrated, mass application of pesticides arose out of 
a realignment of agriculture - from labour- to capital-intensive practices - rather than 
from an inability to feed people.52 
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The Smarden incident forced people to confront the extent and propriety of the 
use of chemical pesticides in Britain. When the MAFF Infestation Control Laboratory  
analysed one of the Julls’ dead cows, ‘Melba’, for evidence of chlorinated pesticide 
residue in late August, it found very small traces of Aldrin, BHC, Dieldrin, DDT, DDE, 
DDD (Rothane), Endrin, Heptachlor, and Heptaclor epoxide.53 As a civil servant 
complained in another context, improved techniques permitted detection of miniscule – 
and perhaps insignificant – quantities of insecticides. Nevertheless, findings like those for 
the Julls’ cows demonstrated the pervasiveness of organic pesticides in the ‘Garden of 
England’ by 1963.54 Addressing an audience in Maidstone, B.D. Moreton, a MAFF 
entomologist, estimated that 1,000 tons of DDT had been used in Kent since its 
introduction about fifteen years earlier.55 He urged greater caution in its use and 
application after declaring himself ‘terrified’ by the quantity thus far deployed. Other 
critics complained that, generally, British experts had asserted that Carson’s arguments 
did not apply to the British context. Smarden, they observed, proved this patently untrue. 
Furthermore, Americans had withheld approval for fluoroacetamide.56 In the case of 
fluoroacetamide, Britain stole a march on the US in the dissemination of a deadly weapon 
of war as a pesticide. 
Prior to the publication of Silent Spring, the people of Britain had been alerted to 
the possible dangers surrounding the use of organo-chlorine and organo-phosphorous 
insecticides, which were widely disseminated after 1945. Following the death of seven 
agricultural workers between 1946 and 1950, a working party was established, under the 
chairmanship of Solly Zuckerman, to make recommendations ‘for the promotion of the 
safety of workers in the agricultural use of substances toxic or harmful to human beings’. 
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The remit of this working party was widened in 1951 and 1953 to include an assessment 
of the risks to consumers (of food treated with agricultural chemicals) and to wildlife. 
The Inter-Departmental Advisory Committee on Poisonous Substances Used in 
Agriculture and Food Storage, which was created in 1954, arose out of this Governmental 
activity; and a voluntary notification scheme was implemented in 1957. The Pesticides 
Safety Precautions Scheme was truly ‘a typical British invention’: it relied on the 
Association of British Manufacturers of Agricultural Chemicals (ABMAC) to notify 
MAFF of every new chemical insecticide, herbicide, and fungicide, and of each new use 
of any existing one; and to provide toxicological reports. The Advisory Committee 
would, in turn, consult with a Scientific Sub-Committee, composed of specialist panels 
and representatives of voluntary bodies and specialist institutions (excluding 
manufacturers), to verify the properties and toxicity of the pesticide, and to issue safety 
recommendations.57 
Toxicology, however, poses significant difficulties. Different species of animal 
often have widely divergent reactions to the same poison, so it can be dangerous to 
presume that one species will react in a certain way after experimental trials on a 
different one.58 Humans, for example, can excrete sodium fluoroacetate whereas dogs 
cannot. Consequently, this particular chemical is far more toxic to dogs than humans.59 
Under these circumstances, chemicals were frequently released without a proper grasp of 
their environmental impact. Within the voluntary scheme, chemical manufacturers could 
justify lack of control on insufficient knowledge: a chemical was ‘innocent until proven 
guilty’.60 Problematically, therefore, chemical hazards were no longer contained by 
clearly circumscribed laboratories: society became the new laboratory. The ineffable 
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nature of laboratory-bound ‘mysteries’ of expertise was, therefore, subjected to public 
scrutiny, and in the process opened itself to contestation.61 Ulrich Beck contends that this 
kind of greater transparency called attention to the undemocratic underpinnings of the 
expertise which lay behind technocracy: unelected scientists were making potentially 
earth-altering decisions. Increasingly, the long-held belief in science as rational, 
disinterested knowledge, in aid of statecraft, faced searching criticism.62 
The possible shortcomings of a technocratic, laissez-faire approach to the mass 
application of pesticides became obvious in Britain between 1956 and 1961. A significant 
number and variety of birds were found dead. These were principally seed-eating birds, 
such as woodpigeons, pheasants, and partridges; and eastern England was 
disproportionately affected. In 1959-60, 1,300 foxes and a number of farm dogs, cats, and 
badgers were also found dead. Occurring in the breadbasket of England, and affecting 
seed-eating birds, this deadly episode was soon attributed to dieldrin, which had been 
used as a seed dressing. This chemical was one of the cyclodiene group of chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, which also included aldrin, heptachlor, endosulphan and endrin. After the 
mid-1950s, dieldrin was widely used as a seed dressing against wheat bulb fly in Britain. 
The work of the Nature Conservancy and voluntary bodies, such as the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds, the British Trust for Ornithology, and the Game Research 
Association, identified dieldrin as the culprit of mass poisoning among Britain’s wildlife. 
The Government responded with a voluntary seasonal moratorium on the application of 
dieldrin seed dressings. Although farmers could safely use the chemical in the autumn, 
when it was least dangerous to birds, they should refrain from applications on spring-
sown wheat.63 
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Arriving in the wake of the dieldrin episode, Carson’s Silent Spring fell on fertile 
ground in the UK. Those persons who contended that the book did not apply to Britain 
missed Carson’s overarching argument by focusing exclusively on DDT. Admittedly, 
most experts in Britain maintained that DDT had not had the same sinister impact in the 
UK as it had in the USA. But this was not a result of a superior regulatory regime: it was 
indicative of different agricultural environments and, therefore, less need for mass 
spraying of DDT. More broadly, the dieldrin episode proved that Britain could not ignore 
the clarion call to heed the ecological dangers of mass applications of chemical 
pesticides. Dieldrin, after all, was far more toxic than DDT, as Carson had pointed out 
when she dealt with the subject in Silent Spring.64 When the use of toxic chemicals was 
debated in the House of Lords in the spring of 1963, copies of Silent Spring sat beside 
both dispatch boxes, and the book was a point of reference for almost every speaker.65  
The environmental impact of a toxic chemical – dieldrin – generated increasing 
ecological consciousness in Britain. Beginning in 1961, the Government officially 
consulted ecologists as part of the screening process for potential pesticides.66 Rachel 
Carson, by placing her critical examination of the pervasiveness of toxic chemicals 
within an ecological narrative, offered readers, who were already familiar with the 
dieldrin episode, a clear explanatory framework for further discussion and debate. In 
March 1963, Punch published a cartoon that humourously captured ecological 
sensibilities. As two men stood over a dead dog in a rural setting, one explained to the 
other: ‘This is the dog that bit the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that came from 
the grain that Jack sprayed’.67 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the industrial waste spill at Smarden came to light 
in 1963, it was located in a Carson-inspired frame. Reflecting on the ‘Smarden affair’ as 
‘by far the most disturbing’ example of ‘the “slow but steady poisoning of the whole 
countryside”’, an editorial in the Kent & Sussex Courier opined: 
The whole trouble with agriculture today – with its massive use of artificial aids 
for boosting crops and yields, and its increasing reliance on insecticides and pest 
controls of which all too often little is really known – is that man has chosen to 
work against rather than with Nature. 
Science marches on, its brilliant exponents blinded, it seems, to the simple 
but absolute truth that Nature must achieve a balance. Man’s role is to co-operate 
with, not to try to control Nature. In place of methods of destruction, he needs to 
learn how to utilize her vast resources for restoration and to turn the full light of 
his research upon the infinitely more promising science of ecology.68 
 
Similarly, when the deaths of dogs and cats at Merthyr Tydfil came to light, a 
correspondent to The Guardian attacked the irresponsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. After further noting the ministry’s cavalier attitude to aldrin and dieldrin, he 
continued: 
What folly is this that flies in the face of evidence submitted to the Ministry over 
the years? Even Rachel Carson’s findings and grim warnings (based on five 
years’ research) were dismissed in official circles as being irrelevant to our own 
society. Is it being too optimistic that these murderous poisons will be withdrawn 
before the American experience is repeated here?69 
 
In 1963-64, the events at Smarden and Merthyr Tydfil were subsumed within an 
ecological critique of pesticides, which carried resonances of the earlier dieldrin 
poisonings in Britain. Although the UK Government had already committed itself to 
some ecological expertise, it remained principally out of the public gaze. Carson and the 
fluoroacetamide poisonings introduced a popular ecology, with which critics attacked the 
synthetic society of modernity, which was driven by government, the military, and 
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capitalism. Moreover, the ecological implications of pervasive pesticides underscored the 
deficiencies of existent, technocratic-inspired reductionist pollution legislation. 
SMARDEN AND THE LIMITS OF POLLUTION LEGISLATION 
The twentieth century witnessed a vast proliferation of synthetic chemicals; and, as 
Smarden demonstrated, these infiltrated air, water, and land. As various ministries of the 
Government sought to define and contain the incident at Smarden, they noted the 
potential shortcomings of environmental legislation, which had arisen out of the 
nineteenth-century ‘revolution in government’ – the expansion of public administration, 
underpinned by scientific expertise.  Could nineteenth-century legislation address the 
ecological complexities of the twentieth-century chemical revolution? Lowe, of Great 
Omenden Farm, who struggled to place the events of Smarden within his vision of 
Britain, bemoaned the inadequacy of existent legislation. He told Good, ‘I find this 
position, where a potential danger has been brought about by an industrial enterprise in a 
Rural District which has cost animal life so far and may bring more danger, not 
compatible with modern legislation …’.70 Smarden foregrounded the limitations of the 
‘politics of pollution’ in the late twentieth century. In the absence of a distinct ministry of 
the environment, there was a notable lack of clearly defined institutions and experts to 
conduct public discussion of the crisis which beset Smarden. By the conclusion of the 
episode, ten different central governmental ministries, all with competing interests and 
experts, were involved. 
In his examination of the ‘politics of pollution’, Albert Weale discerns a common 
pattern of progression. First, building on existing policies and structures of pollution 
control, legislation addresses air and surface water. Legislative priorities subsequently 
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shift to chemical pollutants; and then, finally, encompass waste disposal.71 The 
Governmental response to the Smarden incident followed this trajectory.  
Through the drift of noxious fumes and Rentokil’s misdirection, the spectre of 
methyl bromide meant that the Smarden incident was initially framed as an air pollution 
incident. When the West Ashford Rural District Council halted production at the Rentokil 
factory in August, the Kent Messenger reported this as action taken against the ‘Smarden 
“smell”’, which one member of the Council proclaimed ‘was perfectly shocking’.72 
Similarly, in his second letter to the Ministry of Agriculture, Judge J.D. Casswell 
complained of a ‘nuisance’ that arose from the manufacture of an insecticide using 
bromine. He associated the resultant fumes with the death of a foal, two goats, and 
approximately 100 rabbits on his son’s farm, which was 100 yards from the Smarden 
factory on the opposite side of the road.73 With the Killer Smog episode of December 
1952 still fresh in people’s memories, it was, perhaps, unsurprising that a London 
resident would link the death of animals and the poor health of humans to air pollution. 
But the events of 1952 may also have made Casswell more aware of the legalities of air 
pollution. The word ‘nuisance’ carried meaning in common law. Moreover, Casswell 
concluded his letter by noting that the Rentokil factory did not have the required licence 
under the Alkali Acts. In Britain, public interest in pollution was served by a combination 
of nuisance law and administrative procedures stretching back to the nineteenth century.74 
Smarden was more than a struggle between city and country, or industry and 
agriculture: it was a reminder of the tensions between government and industry, and 
voluntarism and statutory regulation in the control of pollution. In the midst of the 
Smarden incident, on 10 September 1963, Keith Joseph, Minister of Housing and Local 
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Government, elected to celebrate the centenary of the passage of the first Alkali Act. A 
celebratory reception would be warranted irrespective of Smarden, but the wording of 
Joseph’s invitation was telling: ‘the present seems to be a suitable occasion to call 
attention to the very considerable efforts made by industry, generally, in collaboration 
with the Alkali Inspectorate to keep air pollution to a minimum – this in spite of the 
problems as posed by constantly changing technical developments and vastly increased 
output’.75 Joseph consistently characterized the Smarden incident as a one-off that could 
not have been foreseen.76 By the time that he made this strong declaration to Christopher 
Soames, Minister of Agriculture, suspicions had shifted firmly to fluoroacetamide and 
water pollution. The Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts, argued Joseph, were entirely 
adequate for prosecution and punishment of persons who pollute streams. 
Soames, writing to Keith Joseph, on 17 November, indicated that he was pleased 
the River Board had the situation under control and that they were convinced that there 
was no further risk of trouble from the Smarden factory.77 As early as 26 July 1963, a 
spokesman for the Kent River Board had displayed startling self-confidence in his 
statement to the Ashford Examiner: ‘We are satisfied that whatever reason for complaint 
there may have been about the discharge of trade effluent into a ditch earlier in the year, 
those reasons do not exist now’.78 Nevertheless, Soames expressed concern that such an 
incident could occur, and he wished to give the public reassurance that precautions were 
being introduced so that there would not be a repetition. Perhaps, he suggested, the River 
Board needed to extend the scope of its water analyses. Joseph responded by insisting 
that, although ‘a most distressing story’, it was not one that could have been predicted or 
prevented.79 The River Board could not have known of the possible dangers because they 
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were unaware of processes carried on by factories in their areas and of the chemicals 
involved. Moreover, they could not prevent ‘accidental or careless spilling’. The only 
recourse was legal action: ‘So far as the law is concerned the Rivers (Prevention of 
Pollution) Acts make ample provision for the prosecution and punishment of the people 
who pollute streams. We do not need more legislation’. But as he then acknowledged, the 
only public body which could undertake legal action was the River Board, and they had 
elected not to on the grounds that they had insufficient evidence to ensure success. 
A.G. Stirk, Clerk of the Kent River Board, explained, on 9 October 1963, why his 
organization had not mounted action against Rentokil.80 If action was taken, it would be 
through Section 2 (1) (a) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1951, which would 
require them to establish that ‘poisonous, noxious or polluting’ matter had entered the 
stream, and that the company had caused or knowingly permitted the material to enter it. 
The company denied that they had ever dumped, on their premises, any waste which had 
arisen from the manufacture of fluoroacetamide; and they claimed no knowledge of this 
being done by an employee without their authority. Under these circumstances, explained 
Stirk, the Board could not hope to mount a successful prosecution.  
Several months earlier, the River Board had advised the Council to deny Rentokil 
planning permission to manufacture methyl bromide.81 Although they ultimately acted 
against fluoroacetamide, the Council followed the suggested course of action.82 They did 
so in the face of opposition from Rentokil, who contended that, unlike methyl bromide, 
the manufacture of fluoroacetamide was covered within their earlier planning permission 
for ‘light industrial’ use. Ministry of Housing and Local Government officials had 
privately speculated that Rentokil might have had a case. After all, they reasoned, the 
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production of fluoroacetamide produced no noise or smell.83 Considerations of toxicity, 
therefore, were not clearly articulated within the planning legislation which the 
Government contended was the best means for addressing this pollution incident. In the 
event, Rentokil elected not to contest the Council’s ‘discontinuance order’ for fear of 
further adverse publicity. This did not, however, alleviate public concerns. Despite the 
Government’s best efforts to contain this incident as a deviation from planned 
management, the events at Smarden elicited broader questions about the health of the 
countryside and of humans.  
THE PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT AT SMARDEN 
The twentieth century had ushered in an ‘epidemiological transition’ from a pre-industrial 
demographic regime, dominated by epidemic infectious diseases, to modern patterns of 
death from chronic degenerative diseases. At the same time, the rise of scientific 
medicine generated an elevated awareness of disease and illness.84 Murray Bookchin’s 
Our synthetic environment (1962) placed one facet of this epidemiological transition in 
the post-Second World War context. Bookchin argued that concerns for infectious 
diseases had been replaced by public health problems which had arisen from 
environmental pollution.85 For people in Britain, the events at Smarden reinforced the 
possible human health risks arising from the use of toxic pesticides. 
From a very early stage in their investigations, the Government maintained that 
there was no threat to human health.86 In September 1963, Deedes informed his fellow 
cabinet ministers that locals accepted this point; but this was a misreading of the 
situation.87 Although Government officials and scientists privately dismissed any risk to 
human health, they were reluctant to provide such assurances to locals. The latter, 
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therefore, consistently highlighted the possible threat to humans. In August, for example, 
Lowe’s solicitors warned the Government, the Council, and the National Farmers’ Union 
that ‘there is a danger of human as well as animal deaths in addition to animal deaths 
which have already occurred’.88 At the same time, ten persons, representing five 
households, presented a petition to the Council, which expressed concern for the health of 
animals and humans.89 Writing to the Council in early September, Good ‘included human 
life as well as animal life being in danger’.90  
As events unfolded in August and September 1963, the tensions between 
Government advice and local experiences of the continuing incident became more 
pronounced. Additional cows began to sicken and die after July. H.M. Elliott, Medical 
Officer to the Ministry of Health, visited Smarden on 20 August, and gave the Council 
and local medical officers assurances that there was ‘no risk to the health of humans’, and 
that he could see no danger to cattle, or from their milk, based on the current levels of 
fluoride found in the ditch water.91 But Elliott was clearly confused about the implicated 
poison. In a three-way exchange between Elliott, J.L. Griggs, and Good in September, it 
became evident that Elliott was offering advice on safe levels of exposure to an inorganic 
fluorine compound, such as sodium fluoride, when, in fact, fluoroacetamide was a far 
more toxic organic compound. Good explained the distinction to Griggs, but Elliott 
continued to contest the veterinarian’s distinction.92 In an earlier internal Ministry of 
Health memorandum, Elliott had been dismissive of Good’s evidence and claims: 
When I saw Mr Griggs the Clerk of the R.D.C. he told me that he had a letter 
from a Vet. Mr. Goode [sic] who was acting on behalf of one of the farmers who 
had lost stock. He said he had samples of the water analysed by the County 
Analyst who found 0.4, 0.6 and 23 p.p.m. of fluoride. Mr Goode went on to say 
that water containing 0.1 p.p.m. (repeat 0.1 p.p.m.) would be toxic to animals. I 
assured Mr. Griggs that this was not so and that no harm would come to cattle if 
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they drank water containing 23 p.p.m. for several weeks, nor would the milk yield 
be affected. I said I would consider it safe for milk to be sold for consumption if it 
contained 5 p.p.m. of fluoride though not of course as a normal procedure.93 
 
One week after Elliott’s visit, four more cattle, from the Julls’ farm, had to be 
slaughtered at a knacker’s yard.94 During this process, a dog consumed some of the offal 
from one of the cows and died. On a veterinarian’s advice, two more dogs were fed liver 
and spleen from the cattle, as a diagnostic test, and subsequently died. Dr J. Marshall, the 
local Medical Officer of Health, immediately stopped the sale of any further milk from 
the Julls’ herd, and telephoned Elliott to inform him of his actions. By the end of 
September, the 11 remaining cows from the initial herd of 26 had to be destroyed: the 
carcasses were burned on the farm on 30 September, and were left in a field, where they 
were inspected by the Deputy Divisional Veterinary Officer of the Animal Health 
Division on 9 October. He satisfied himself that the ashes were not in a water catchment 
area and that animals could not gain access to them. He then suggested that the Julls don 
protective gear and bury the ashes to a depth greater than six feet. He concluded his 
internal report to MAFF with the following statement: ‘The knowledge or assumption of 
non-destruction by cremation of the substance fluoroacetamide was held but not raised by 
or conveyed to the owner’.95 
Another fluoroacetamide incident in Merthyr Tydfil in the same month, 
compounded public concerns. Moreover, because it involved the death of domestic pets, 
it effectively shifted the focus of fluoroacetamide toxicity from farmers’ fields to 
people’s homes. The Merthyr Tydfil incident was traced to the consumption of the flesh 
of a single contaminated pony, which was rendered into pet food following its death.96 
The local veterinary surgeon, D.H. Phillips, was aware of the incident at Smarden and 
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had been in contact with Good, so the Veterinary Laboratory at Weybridge was 
consulted, and determined that the pony and dogs had died from an organic fluoride 
poison. On 2 October 1963, BBC Radio News conducted an interview with Dr Barnes, 
Director of the Toxicology Research Unit within the Medical Research Council, to 
inform the public about fluoroacetamide.97 Barnes emphasized the variability of toxicity 
among different species of animals. When questioned whether it could kill a human 
being, he confirmed that it could if the dose was large enough. Perhaps more 
significantly, he went on to summarize the research of Peters, who demonstrated that 
fluoroacetamide only became poisonous once it was metabolized by the body. As an 
internal MAFF memorandum made clear a few days later, people were becoming more 
alert to the ‘risk of “chain poisoning” …. It could be from cow to milk to child’. 
Explications of chain poisoning had been among the most powerful examples which 
Carson employed to educate the public on the ecological threats of pesticides.98 Once 
again, however, a Ministry of Health official concluded that ‘a precise assessment of the 
human risk is presumably not wanted in the report of what has happened at Merthyr 
Tydfil and Smarden’.99  
Privately, Government scientists bemoaned the fact that the news media were 
linking the two incidents because they had entirely different origins. The Merthyr Tydfil 
episode likely arose from the local authority’s use of fluroacetamide as a rodenticide at a 
local dump, where the pony fatally ingested it. Although the local authority claimed to 
only use warfarin as a rodenticide, Rentokil quickly confirmed that they had recently sold 
them a large consignment of fluoroacetamide. For Good, Phillips, and some of their 
veterinary colleagues, the two incidents were evidence of the dangers arising from the use 
 30 
of toxic chemicals, irrespective of the means by which they contaminated the 
environment. 
When Harold Farris, an employee of the Rentokil factory in Smarden suffered a 
mystery illness in January 1964, fears of human toxicity grew.100 Farris, who had worked 
on the production of fluoroacetamide and the subsequent clearing of ditches, complained 
of a tired drunken feeling that sent him reeling about his house. After he declared that he 
was ‘very worried’, he was sent to the National Poisons Information Centre at Guy’s 
Hospital, London for testing, despite Rentokil’s scepticism. A spokesman for the 
company dismissed the illness as a ‘psychological’ episode in the wake of a bout of 
bronchitis. The implication was that adverse publicity surrounding the death of further 
cows and dogs associated with the Julls’ fields, in December and January, had misled 
Farris to assume that his bronchitis was fluoroacetamide poisoning. One month later, the 
same Rentokil spokesman complained, ‘at the moment the community is so alive with 
rumours that if a cat dies ten miles away, it is because of fluoroacetamide’. Norman Jull 
informed a local journalist that he ‘had seen a medical report on Farris, which stated he 
was suffering from “bronchial pneumonia and fluoroacetamide poisoning”’.101 This 
report was likely that of local medical doctor, E.W. Brentnall, who remained convinced 
of ‘chronic poisoning’, despite the negative findings of Guy’s.102 Lack of an expert 
consensus about possible threats to human health stoked fears at Smarden. These, in turn, 
were subsumed within a broader debate about the fluoridation of drinking water. 
PESTICIDES, FLUORIDATION OF WATER, AND POPULAR ECOLOGY 
Policy, expertise, and public health tensions and concerns regarding fluoroacetamide as a 
pesticide were compounded by post-Second World War disputes surrounding the science 
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of water fluoridation. These associations have endured. As late as July 2003, a 
publication opposed the fluoridation of drinking water, with the erroneous assertion that 
‘fluoride is the active ingredient in most insecticides …’.103  After 1952, there was a 
concerted push from American and British medical, dental, and public health authorities 
to add the element fluorine, in its compound form of sodium fluoride, to drinking water 
to reduce tooth decay (caries) in children. The ensuing public health controversy has been 
long-lived and highly controversial.  
There were significant similarities between British anti-fluoridationists and their 
American counterparts, even if the British failed to embrace the hyperbolic elements of 
Communist conspiracy theories. Both embraced an ideology that articulated fears of an 
increasingly unnatural lifestyle and diet. Growing suspicion of scientific expertise – in 
the form of technocracy – underpinned much of the anti-fluoridationist critique as it 
developed and changed over the ensuing decades.104 Similar themes informed the critical 
response to Smarden’s fluoride pollution incident. Although Good understood the 
different toxic properties of sodium fluoride and fluoroacetamide, he placed the Smarden 
incident in the context of anti-fluoridationist discussions  
Chris Sellers’ analysis of American anti-fluoridation disputes captures the public 
divergence of expertise, and the interconnections between concern for fluoridation of 
drinking water and the mass application of pesticides. Whereas public health experts 
considered fluoride a natural constituent of tap water, anti-fluoridationists saw it as an 
entirely unnatural ‘mass medication for a non-communicable disease’. Contemporaries 
argued as to whether fluoride was a naturally occurring substance or a chemical pollutant. 
Furthermore, Sellers contends that ‘shared local history and experiences’ also shaped 
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perceptions of public health and environmental concerns. In particular, he demonstrates a 
direct link between anti-fluoridationists and the first public legal trial against DDT, which 
proved formative for Rachel Carson’s determination to undertake research on Silent 
Spring.105 As Gretchen Reilly has demonstrated, anti-fluoridationists equated fluoride 
with other ‘chemical pollutants’ - like mercury, lead and DDT - at least a decade before 
the publication of Silent Spring.106 In the US, the officially recognized tolerance level for 
fluoride – 7 ppm – was used as the administrative tolerance for DDT in 1945.107  
Like the anti-fluoridation movement, the complexities of the Smarden incident 
defy easy divisions between experts and laypersons, and are better conceived as publicly 
visible contestation of expertise. Although the Government largely ignored fluoridation 
of drinking water in the context of Smarden, others felt that the subject had to be 
reconsidered in light of this incident. In December 1963, the Kent & Sussex Courier 
reported that the Tonbridge Rural Council had reversed its earlier decision to support the 
fluoridation of water supplies ‘because it feels that fluoridation may be harmful to human 
beings’.108 One month later, the East Sussex National Health Executive Council, which 
encompassed members of the medical and dental professions, declared their support for 
the fluoridation of their county’s drinking water.109 Writing in The Guardian in 
December 1963, Good declared: 
This is no longer a parochial affair but an international one. We might take a more 
energetic look at pesticides in general, and in particular reconsider the wisdom of 
fluoridation of public water supplies.110 
 
Good linked a parochial incident in Smarden to national and international movements. 
Consequently, in March 1964, he once again issued his narrative of events, but this time 
under the auspices of the anti-fluoridationist National Pure Water Association. Earlier, in 
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January 1964, he informed Peters, ‘Fluoridation of water supplies is keenly debated, and I 
cannot be convinced that it is a wise policy’. He doubted the wisdom of ‘such 
medication’.111 In the same month, the Daily Sketch asked:  
What is the Government doing to test, investigate and control the widespread use 
of new drugs, especially chemicals, that are being sprayed on our crops? … What 
are the effects of these drugs on the food we eat? What are the effects of these 
drugs on our unborn children?112 
 
Explicitly responding to recent publicity surrounding Smarden and Silent Spring, this 
particular article drew direct comparisons between the anti-insomnia and anti-nausea 
drug thalidomide and the application of pesticides, such as fluoroacetamide and DDT. 
The press criticism of Smarden tapped into arguments previously rehearsed by anti-
fluoridationists: toxic pesticides were nefarious ‘drugs’ imposed on the population in 
response to non-life-threatening and non-communicable ‘diseases’. Coming at a time 
when various local councils were actively considering fluoridation of water, the Smarden 
fluoroacetamide incident reinforced the longstanding perception of fluorine as a toxic 
element; and highlighted divisions between and among experts and laypersons.113  
By noting the close relationship between pesticides and chemical warfare, Carson 
had cast these substances in the role of weapons of war and mass destruction.114She 
alerted the public to an invisible pollutant that could travel great distance, accumulate in 
body fats, and cause cancer, birth defects, and mutations. Explicitly pairing chemical 
insecticides with radiation, Carson wrote in the shadow of the apocalyptic mushroom 
clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.115 Through the anti-fluoridation movement, 
fluoride had also forged links with Cold War fears and ideology. Throughout the 1950s in 
the USA, anti-Communist ideology constituted a prominent strand of the anti-
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fluoridationist movement. Convinced that water fluoridation was an insidious weapon of 
mass destruction, E.H. Bronner warned: ‘REMEMBER: ATOM BOMBS DESTROY 
EVERYTHING, SODIUM FLUORIDE ONLY THE PEOPLE’.116 Fluoride, it was 
argued, was a poison that would kill or mentally impair the American population, and, 
thus, render the nation defenseless against a Communist invasion. Unwittingly, E. Essig 
deployed a bovine metaphor, which might have carried resonance for the people of 
Smarden four years later, when he discerned an evil plan that was afoot in 1959: ‘It has 
revealed a Communist strategy … of fluoridating drinking water as a means of reducing 
the populace to a mental state of cow-like submission’.117 By the time that the fictional 
Colonel Jack Ripper, in Dr Strangelove: or how I learned to stop worrying and love the 
bomb (1964), initiated a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union because he was convinced 
that Communists were using fluoridation to poison the USA, the heyday of conspiracy 
theories had passed. But anti-fluoridation and its similarities to nuclear fallout lingered. 
Writing to the Sunday Telegraph in late September 1963, food critic Egon Ronay 
expressed dismay over the Smarden poisonings. ‘What is the good’, he asked, ‘of 
philosophical bottoms sitting down solemnly in the hope of stopping atomic fall-out 
while this horrific abuse of sprays with as yet untried consequences on human food pours 
money into chemical manufacturers’ pockets?’118 Like nuclear fallout, the pervasiveness 
of chemicals was an all-encompassing threat to the environment, including its human and 
animal occupants. 
SCIENCE, PROFESSION, AND ANIMAL WELFARE 
Historical accounts of the rise of environmental consciousness in the United States 
contend that modern environmentalism arose from the convergence of wilderness 
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preservation and conservation, public health reform, and ecology.119 The case of Smarden 
underlines the importance of another significant factor for the emergence of 
environmental consciousness in Britain: animal welfare. Smarden did not garner 
considerable national attention until Good helped to expose a link with the poisoning of 
dogs and cats at Merthyr Tydfil.120Tellingly, in February 1964, M.P. John Farr 
summarized the salient issues surrounding the fluoroacetamide incidents by erroneously 
recalling that Merthyr Tydfil pre-dated events at Smarden.121 
The death of two test cows that the Government had placed on the contaminated 
land produced a flurry of media interest in December 1963 and January 1964.  Various 
reports noted the death of the first cow, but the Daily Herald produced one of the most 
emotive accounts, with the declaration that ‘Gert, a gentle elderly Ayrshire cow has laid 
down her life for science’.122As Ministry of Agriculture officials had predicted, however, 
it was not the story of Gert and Daisy that fuelled most of the public outcry. Rather, it 
was the outrage of ‘dog lovers’.123 To confirm fluoracetamide poisoning as the cause of 
the cows’ deaths, four dogs were fed some of the cattle flesh with fatal consequences. 
Newspapers reported wildly inflated numbers of dog casualties – twenty, thirty, an entire 
lorry load.124 Indignant observers connected the senseless loss of animal life with a 
critique of industrial agribusiness, and forced the Government to act. Fluoroactemide was 
banned as an agricultural and gardening insecticide, and 2,000 tons of contaminated soil 
were removed from Smarden in metal drums, and dumped into the sea beyond the 
continental shelf. This followed the earlier dumping of the contaminated water from 
affected ditches and ponds in the tidal waters at Dymchurch. Whereas Rentokil and the 
Government saw the sea as an ‘ultimate sink’ for unwanted waste, their critics expressed 
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incomprehension at the lack of ecological awareness as a persistent toxic chemical was 
transferred from the land to the sea.125  
By December 1963, Douglas Good publicly acknowledged the key role that he 
and his profession had played in the Smarden incident. ‘Veterinary surgeons’, he 
declared, ‘have never ceased to hammer away at demanding that the public should be 
given more information about this poison’.126 Flow of information and concomitant trust 
in expertise constituted the most prominent nexus of tension surrounding this toxic 
episode. As awareness of the contamination dawned in July 1963, Lowe wrote to Good, 
and demanded a ‘conclusive’ report, in the wake of ‘rumours’, so that he could proceed 
with agricultural work on his farm. ‘I am certain that’, he noted, ‘if there would be the 
slightest danger for human or animal life or contamination of crop, you and naturally the 
authorities concerned would point out such danger to me and indeed the other 
neighbouring farmers’.127As Government scientists privately accepted, local veterinarians 
relied upon their regional Veterinary Investigation Centres to provide them with relevant 
investigative results in such situations. But fearing impending litigation against the 
Rentokil factory, the Government prevaricated. Despite initial reports in early and late 
August, the Government delayed disclosure of their evidence. Admittedly, at this point, 
much of it was circumstantial. In September 1963, they released a brief summary of their 
report to the Council, but elected not to provide similar details to Good or to the solicitors 
for the Julls and for Lowe, who had been in contact. Good wrote to Sir John Ritchie, 
Chief Veterinary Officer, requesting results from the Government investigation of late 
July: ‘If no report will be made available to me, would you please let me know, so that I 
may make other private arrangements in order to be able to advise my clients…’.128 
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Soames informed Deedes that discretion was required, in light of possible litigation; and 
that this was a matter best left to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, which 
had been passed the relevant details. Deedes, who had also been in contact with Good, 
identified the dangers of Government inaction: ‘it is just the kind of story which if it gets 
into the Press can create an impression of bureaucratic inefficiency and failure to take 
warnings from people like this vet and although the case arises in my own constituency it 
could, if it went wrong, have much wider repercussions’.129 
Deedes’ warning proved prescient. After scientists completed their more 
definitive biochemical analysis in late November 1963, the Government again delayed 
release of the results. When they had done this in September, events overtook them, and 
suspicions grew and spread, in the wake of the Merthyr Tydfil poisonings. Similarly, the 
delay several months later was soon compounded by the death of the test cows, and of the 
diagnostic dogs. The Daily Herald’s report was typical of the press response: 
Once again a report of public importance is being hushed up by a Government 
Department …. The ministry insist that it must be kept secret. 
` Why? If there are still dangers the public should be warned.130 
 
By the end of January 1964, the Council was sufficiently concerned to demand a 
meeting with ministry officials. Major A.J. Palmer, a former Council chairman, declared, 
‘it will not be until a few people die that anything will be done’. Veronica Wood, who 
chaired the resultant meeting in Ashford in February, closed proceedings with a statement 
that she and her fellow councillors ‘had been disturbed that they had not been allowed to 
see the confidential reports’; and she demanded more cooperation and information from 
the Government in the future. Alert to the dissatisfaction of the local government, Deedes 
subsequently informed the Council that he had arranged for the War Office Chemical 
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Warfare Department at Porton ‘to come in and lend a hand’. He asked that this 
information not be made public because it would, inevitably, ‘create undue excitement’. 
Deedes’ attempt to allay the councillors’ anxieties was, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
unsuccessful. At the next Council meeting, it was reported that rumours had been 
circulating that drivers of the lorries, engaged in removal of contaminated soil at 
Smarden, had been ‘taken ill’.131  
Between October 1963 and January 1964, Good attempted to rouse support from 
the veterinary profession for his campaign against fluoroacetamide and other toxic 
chemicals. Once again, he met with resistance. The editor of the Veterinary Record, the 
official publication of the British Veterinary Association, refused to publish a number of 
Good’s letters for fear of litigation. In fact, for some time, the editor refused to publish 
the word ‘fluoroacetamide’ because he worried that it might be a proprietorial name. 
Through the correspondence pages, Good and five other colleagues railed against 
professional negligence and Government bureaucracy. In December 1963, T.A.R. 
Chipperfield advised his colleagues to look to other literature in the absence of 
information from the Veterinary Record: 
‘Silent Spring’ brings the entire problem into focus – it is not parochial, nor even 
national – it is international; for this is not merely a problem with sentimental or 
emotional facets deriving from the ill-effects produced on wild-life; it affects the 
personal health, Sir, of you and me and our children and grandchildren.132 
 
Significantly, Good, Chipperfield, and other fellow-travellers confronted the dangers to 
animal and human health. Anne Hardy has highlighted the tensions between 
veterinarians’ professional aspirations, and the resistance to a unified pursuit of human 
and animal health throughout the early twentieth century.133Moreover, Good and his 
colleagues expressed dissatisfaction with Government scientists. Phillips asserted: 
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The only ‘mystery’ there is over this poisoning has been the behaviour of should-
be interested bodies…. The Ministries of Health, Housing and Local Government, 
and Agriculture, due to the peculiar code under which they operate and co-
operate, found themselves unable to take any positive or directly helpful 
interest.134 
 
An ‘evil spell’ had truly fallen on the Garden of England, as the competing expertise of 
local and central government and academic scientists, medical doctors, and veterinary 
surgeons became publicly visible. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in June 1964, Good returned to the fray. He implored 
members of his profession not to be afraid of ‘big brother’, and to take greater heed of a 
recently published book, Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines (1964).135 Including a 
foreward by Rachel Carson, Animal Machines offered a damning exposé of factory 
farming, and generated intense media interest.136 Harrison argued that the recent rise of 
factory farming meant that the Protection of Animals Act, 1911, needed to be revisited to 
ensure an end to inhumane practices, which were being perpetrated in the name of 
agricultural efficiency. When the Government established a Committee of Inquiry into 
Systems of Intensive Agriculture in 1964, the chairman called on Harrison for evidence 
and assistance. She, in turn, established her own advisory group to formulate the 
requested recommendations: Douglas Good was one of the seven members.137 
CONCLUSION 
In March 1965, when the Ministry of Agriculture seemed about to grant the Julls 
permission to resume ‘normal cultivations’, Deedes took the opportunity to reflect upon 
the lessons of the Smarden incident.138 After reviewing the subject at hand, he speculated 
that compulsory registration of all pesticides would soon need to replace the existent 
voluntary scheme: ‘In the unending struggle between liberty and the law, the law will 
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have to gain a point here’. Although Smarden was part of the ‘unending’ tensions 
between voluntarism and statutory regulation in British governance, Deedes came closer 
to identifying the historical significance of his role in the episode in his memoirs three 
decades later.139 There, he recounted the narrative of events and, incidentally, noted that, 
as Minister without Portfolio, he found himself struggling to coordinate a plethora of 
ministries and governmental organizations. At the time, Deedes did, indeed, attempt to 
draw different bureaucratic strands together; and he highlighted, for his cabinet 
colleagues, the necessity of providing information and guidance to affected members of 
the public when environmental concerns, such as those at Smarden, arose. He also acted 
as principal Governmental liaison with the West Ashford Rural District Council, which 
felt greatly aggrieved by the lack of information from Westminster.140 In September 
1963, Deedes wrote to Soames: 
I appreciate that litigation complicates it from the Ministry’s point of view. But it 
would obviously be unfortunate if, in the interval, more animals perished through 
lack of guidance. The feeling in the locality is that somebody is doing something 
dangerous to animal health … and no authority seems to exist, even after an 
enquiry, to stop them. If there is no further risk, it would be helpful to say so; if 
there is, then clearly someone should act. 
It is a tiresome business, but I think there is some danger of responsibility for 
immediate action falling between the three Ministries concerned.141 
 
As Johnson noted a decade later, the rise of ecological consciousness forced ‘politicians 
to think about the issues, more clearly than they were in the habit of doing’. Moreover, ‘it 
forced them to question whether the political structures they had evolved were adequate 
to the task and, if not, what changes were needed’.142 This was a cumulative process to 
which Smarden contributed. Through accident of circumstance, however, Smarden was 
in the Ashford constituency of Deedes, Minister without Portfolio. Deedes demonstrated 
the desirability and efficacy of cross-departmental co-ordination in matters of the 
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environment. By the late 1960s, Harold Wilson, Labour Prime Minister, realized the 
necessity of consolidating responsibilities across different Governmental departments, 
when matters of pollution arose. Consequently, he appointed an environmental ‘overlord’ 
in 1969. Responding to the same motivations, Ted Heath, his Conservative successor, 
established the Department of Environment the following year, in November 1970.143  
Deedes’ comments in March 1965 preceded his contribution to an adjournment 
debate in the House of Commons, which he had requested because of the ‘wider national 
implications’ of the events at Smarden. He reiterated his call for ‘safer’ regulation of ‘the 
manufacture, distribution, and use of toxic chemicals’; but he also used parliamentary 
privilege to denounce Rentokil, which had recently sold its factory in Smarden to a 
pesticide subsidiary of the Guinness corporation:144 
I must add this in fairness to everybody concerned: the mismanagement of the 
previous occupiers, Rentokil, was wholly responsible for this very serious 
industrial accident. 
 Indeed, it was not wholly an accident. It was caused by serious neglect …. 
This company made the early task of the investigators into the nature and the 
cause of the mysterious deaths of so many animals far more difficult than it need 
have been. It behaved irresponsibly, and that must be put on record.145 
 
The events at Smarden seemed to confirm Silent Spring’s dire warnings about the 
potential environmental pitfalls of greed, and, thereby, located a criticism of capitalism 
amidst debates about science and governance. 
 As a result of the Smarden incident, the Government banned the use of 
fluoroacetamide as an insecticide. Critics, both within Parliament and beyond it, realized 
that this measure seemed to contradict the Government’s contention that this was a one-
off toxic waste spill, which affected domesticated animals, and had nothing to do with the 
threat of pesticides to the environment. In late February 1964, the Government 
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announced that it would conduct an inquiry into the dangers of toxic industrial waste, 
which would encompass the chemical industry, water interests, and local authorities.146 
This reaction, however, stood in stark contrast to the Government’s response to a 
subsequent dangerous waste incident. In 1972, within days of the discovery of drums 
containing cyanide on waste ground near a children’s playground in Nuneaton, 
Warkwickshire, the Government passed The Deposit of Poisonous Waste Act.147 
Undoubtedly, this rapid response was representative of the growing power of 
environmental interest groups, such as the Conservation Society, and of increased 
environmental consciousness, which had been spurred on by Smarden. But the lack of a 
similar response in Smarden was symptomatic of a different perception of the incident. 
Smarden had been located within a Carson-inspired ecological critique of pesticides. 
 MacPhee had been misguided in according the fluoroacetamide poisonings of 
1963 pre-eminence over Silent Spring. The Smarden incident was a ‘galvanizing event’ 
for the UK precisely because it provided a local ‘reception’ for Carson’s universal tale. 
Ostensibly, this tale addressed the ‘evil spell’ cast by a global pall of poison, but it was, 
fundamentally, a critique of the high modernist project of state management of the 
environment. The increasing profile of toxic hazards undermined faith in the expertise 
which underpinned technocracy. As such, the events at Smarden helped to galvanize 
emergent environmentalism within the rubric of a ‘crisis in trust’.148 Responding to the 
Government’s proposed sea disposal plan in February 1964, M.P. James Hoy 
complained: 
The Minister said … that he had an assurance from so-called experts that this 
would be rendered harmless if it were to be dumped into the sea at a particular 
distance but, after all, it was the experts who advised on the use of this material to 
begin with and they proved to be wrong. So what greater assurance can we have 
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that another assurance, which the experts have given the Minister, that the stuff 
will do no harm to the fishing grounds, can be relied on?149  
 
As Beck has observed, the prominent risks from human-generated hazards have placed 
scientists in an ambiguous position, as both the originators of toxic threats and the 
specialists required to neutralize or remove them. 
 Douglas Good, a scientist, was dissatisfied with the secretive expertise of the 
Government and the professional reticence of the British Veterinary Association. Like 
Carson, he initiated a media campaign against the pervasive use of toxic chemicals by 
assuming the non-scientific and non-professional role of a storyteller. His BBC Radio 
broadcast was entitled, ‘The Smarden Story’. Similarly, he circulated his ‘short story’ 
through the news media and through the publications of organizations - anti-fluoridation 
and organic - which opposed technocratic manipulation of the environment. Moreover, as 
Robert Waller, the newly appointed editor of Mother Earth, demonstrated, this opposition 
was often grounded in an explicitly emotive and non-scientific ‘ecology’. When Good 
turned his attention to factory farming, he despaired: ‘I venture to forecast that before the 
turn of the century, so-called civilized populations will be suffering from malnutrition of 
the mind and body, and this in spite of education for all and an abundance of food in the 
shops and on the larder shelves ….150 
Smarden was the ‘village of fear’ over which hung ‘the threat of death …for nine 
months’.151 Writing in 1965, Coleman-Cooke referred to the ‘long shadows which fell 
over the village’. Smarden, in turn, has cast long shadows. Like the persistent pesticides 
that drew the ire of Carson and Good, the memory of Smarden has lingered as a 
cautionary tale about science, government, and the industrialization of agriculture. In 
1985, the first case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was diagnosed in 
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Smarden, Kent, and the county subsequently experienced a number of cases. Twelve 
years later, a perceived cluster of cases of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease led to 
speculations that this prion-based human form of BSE was caused by excessive exposure 
to pesticides, such as those spilled in Smarden in 1963.152 Tellingly, when the Countess 
of Mar pursued this connection in the House of Lords in 1996, she sought ‘details about 
the incident known as “Smarden poisoning” which occurred between June 1963 and 
March 1964 at the government factory manufacturing the pesticide 
fluoroacetamide…’.153 Similarly, the national press reported that the residents of 
Smarden suspected that the fluoroacetamide incident had been ‘a Government-controlled 
experiment … and a cover-up’ which had produced BSE. Significantly, the scientist who 
promoted the links between Smarden and BSE was identified as an independent biologist. 
Media reports pitted him against ‘GOVERNMENT-BACKED ORTHODOXY’.154 
Conflicting expertise surrounding public health, agriculture, and animal welfare starkly 
demonstrated the struggle to manage rationally the environment - from fluoroacetamide 
to BSE. 
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